Beware xargs security holes

[Dave Eisen]

In article <3940 at awdprime.UUCP> tif at doorstop.austin.ibm.com (Paul Chamberlain) writes:
>In article <tim.656101080 at ggumby> tim at ggumby.cs.caltech.edu (Timothy L. Kay) writes:
>>tif at doorstop.austin.ibm.com (Paul Chamberlain) writes:
>>>In article brnstnd at kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) writes:
>>>>  find / -name '#*' -atime +7 -print | xargs rm
>>>>lets a malicious user remove every file on the system.
>>>
>
>In any case, I've yet to see how "a malicious user [could]
>remove every file on the system."
>

If xargs is implemented using system (as it is on this machine),
an old file named #<newline>-rf * will remove every file on the machine if
the rm -rf * happens to be the start of the buffer passed to system.




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