BSD tty security, part 4: What You Can Look Forward To

[Karl Denninger]

In article <1991May1.170641.17086 at eng.umd.edu> russotto at eng.umd.edu (Matthew T. Russotto) writes:
>In article <1991Apr30.224740.17040 at pcserver2.naitc.com> kdenning at pcserver2.naitc.com (Karl Denninger) writes:
>>
>>The most obvious attempts, taking over "unused" ptys slave ends, result in
>>the system skipping them when assignment time comes around.  This prevents
>>the most obvious ways to exploit this hole.  I believe MIPS may be using
>>some form of "O_EXCL" to prevent multiple access....
>>
>>The RS/6000 dynamically creates ptys, and thus doesn't suffer from the
>>problem at all.
>>
>>ISC, Apple (A/UX), and Sun, DO have the problem.
>>
>>KUDOS TO MIPS ON THIS ONE.  They got it right.
>
>With Sun and Ultrix, you seem to be able to affect telnets while the 'login'
>and 'passwd:' prompts are up-- once the session starts, Ultrix stops the
>TIOCSTI process, and Sun hangs up both the incoming telnet and the TIOCSTI
>process.  A/UX doesn't even have TIOCSTI-- am I missing something?

Ultrix and MIPS are only related in that MIPS supplies DEC with the chips.

We have a MIPS RISCserver here, model 3260.  Runs Risc/OS 4.52.  Darn nice
implementation.  I keep finding more and more things to like about it, and
only a few I don't like.

DEC's porting base for Ultrix is not related to RiscOS as far as I know.

--
Karl Denninger - AC Nielsen, Bannockburn IL (708) 317-3285
kdenning at nis.naitc.com

"The most dangerous command on any computer is the carriage return."
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